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Summary 
Talong as his starting point the methodological precepts of the American 
liheml political scientist AIL1m Pn:ewnf"ki <1hout the lmpot umce of the al'liun-
thc:ury unalr.-is u( the trnns(ormttuunal dynamics of postauthoritanan societies, 
the author looks into the pm~rect.~ of liheral reform~ in F.~!ltr-rn Europe. The 
central thesis of the ru tiel~ is tuaL the rdur!IIS' su~'t.'t.Ss depends o n the balance 
ot power bet:ween the liberal nnd the narional-populist elites, wllo vie for pnh-
lic support. The oul<"nllll" u( thnt Sl t uggle will uepentl un the way in which the 
t:umpering elites will act in response to five essential conrexrunl fnctOI's: the 
need for economic and social security, the expe.-rntivns uf swiul JU~t ic<!, the 
dyuruni..::. u[ the integrutiuu with the West, the a.rtic:ulatio n of the national 
identity within a national state, rmd, pos.c;ibly, the exis tence n( ... rhnic mino(ities 
(i.e. the rhreat of inter t thnic l'OII fiicb) 
lf we are to draw conclusions from the prevailing mow.J in mass media 
and in numerous social anti M:it:ntific anilly e: and debates, then the pe-
riw.J following the shon outburst of enthusiasm of 1989/'JO in Eastem 
Europe is a period of disappointment. The c::uphoria, which followed the 
peaceful disintegration uf the CC.lmmunist regimes in &\stern Europe, and 
even the repeated predictions about ··the end of histOI)" ami the un. et of 
an epoch of an equable liberal-tlcmo<.Tatic po ·I history, has gJVen way to a 
sense of hiucm~-s causerl hy the processes which have surfaced in Easteru 
Europe: the stir:rings of nationalism and chauvinism which in !heir extreme 
forms may lead to a war; political t.'tmjonctures of populist and authoritar-
ian movements and parties: profound and prorracted economic recession)\ 
causing disastrous unemployment; the nonexistent or l'lowed-down privati-
zation which has left the key economic areas under state control: market 
economy untlcrmined by criminal practices and con uption. Tl seems that 
wilh such developments, the fu tu re of liheraJ in ·tit utions and values in 
Eastern Europe is not parli t;trh•rly bright. 
I am pn~itive that such a disma l image of Eastt.:m Em ope rests on a 
rough generalization and is the refore incorrect, primarily because it is a 
product of the pe: simism triggered off by unfulfilled expect<~ lions and not 
a result of <~ sober ana lysis based on realities . In Lhis paper my aim is to 
go beyond such simplistic generalizations - regardless of whether they are 
optimi tically or pessimislil:ally intoned. My aim is to look into thl!. issue 
of the future of libcralil'm in El'lstem Europe by offering a differentiated 
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analysis. Before l do that, let me explain what 1 understand by liberalism 
and which mel hoclolugie<tl presumptions serve as my sta rting point. 
l. 
When 1 think about future pro. peeL of libtmtli ·m in Eastern Europe, 
thc::o I have in mimi only the fundamental economic and political in~t1tu­
liunl> and values which are accepted as the tfum.lamcntal infra tructure of 
social, economic and political sy h:m of developed Western societies. By 
this I undcr..umd, fin.t, market economy based on satisfactory legal o;caJ-
rity of civil society, and second, liberal democrdc..:y. The first also inc.ludes, 
apan from the legal guarantees uf individual (reedoms and property. 
which arc H prerequisite for autonomous market activity, complementary 
oonflict-regulating mechanisms of intere t organit.alion · plus the indispen-
sable administrntive rm:chanisms of the s tate (from the national b~u1k to 
forcib'" trade and tax policy). The la tte r also incluuc:-~, apart from ade-
quate constitutional, legal anu factu ~ll guarantees of the freedom of ex-
pression ami political activity, those mechanisms that ensure genuine politi-
cal competition, the possibility of a lternation iin government, freely elected 
parliamentary legislature ami lied. ion-making based on the majority rule. T 
am com i11cctl 1 hat the listed elements are that minimum of liberal insti-
tutions which should be, today am.l in the ne<tr future, impJemented and 
establish~d in Eastern Eurupc. 
My methodological line of approach to the: il\suc of future prospects of 
the described process is that of Ad<tm Pr7eworskl, a liberal Amc::rican po-
litica l scientist, set forth in his ana lysis of the transitiomtl processes in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe .l Pm;wor.ski criticizes socia l scientific 
procedure which strives at "~"essing the chances of democratic transition 
and conwliualinn sole ly on the basis of tht: ana lysis of contextual and 
..,tructuraJ conditions. Such a pnK:cdure implies structural determimm1 
which totally ignore." the actua.l protagonists and their possibilities of 
choice and how they decide upon whid1 path of action to pursue, and is 
therefore politically totally futile. Contrary to that, he ad\Ocalcs the 
analysis who e main ~uhjccl are sociaJ and political pmtagonist - natu-
rally, in tbt: cnnle'f of ever changing conditions. 
1 Pr..:cworski, Adam, "The Game:. of Transilino'", in: Mainwuriog, Scott, 
Guillermo O'Douuell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (cu.), Dcmncr:wc Consolidatiou: 
Tlu: New Snurh AmenC:m DewOCTllci~ in Cnmparam·e Persp.xtivr:. Universicy of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre D:tme, 1992. pp. 105-152. lbat article further elabo-
mlcs on L'rzeworski's argumentation, whicb was expostulated in the second chap-
ter of hi<~ book DellJOCiacy 1111d the Markee: l'olitica/ :wd Econumic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin Americ.a, Cambridge University l'ress, Cambridge, 1991. 
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My point of dcp<lrture, therefore, is Przeworski's action-theoretical 
model, which will be used when answering my specific q ueries. My re-
search is two-leveled: 
- first the constellalions nf the principal protagoui.sts of the East 
European transition towards ma rket economy and liberal democracy are l.o 
be analyzeu in a vety general, and thus hypothetic manner, as well as the 
most impOliant contextua l conditions which inlluence their democratic le-
gitimation; 
- then I sbalJ attempt to apply these hypothetic constellations on the 
experiences of the trnnsition of individual East European countries in or-
der to be able tn draw specif ic conclusions about the future of those 
transitionnl processes. 
This will give rise to a plethora of scenarios for possible and probable 
(in line with Przeworsk.i) "games of transit inn" . 
2. 
Who are the ptincipal protagonists of the political game o.n whose out-
come the prnspccts of llu:: consolidation of liberal iJlStitutions in Eastern 
Europe depend? It could be claimed very generalJy, in accordance with 
the themy of modernization: at the national level (which is here particu-
larly interesting and the reason why the intemtt:uiary anu the local levels 
have been left out) these are on the one band political elites that, via 
parties, formulate competing programmes of political mobilization, and on 
the o ther, general political pnhlic, i.e. citizens-voters who, wilh tht:ir indi-
vidual votum democraticalJy provide legitimation fo r the programmes ac-
ceptable to the majority. ill East European cou ntries, however, the politi-
cal elites are dichotomously polarized: liheral anu national-populist elites 
are confronted . My hypothesis is that the introduction and the consolida-
tion of liberal institutions in Eastern Europe depend on how much liberal 
political elites are capable of politie<tlly pushing back and marginalizing 
national populists. The sole protagonist that might interfere with this game 
are ethnic mi11ority groups or their political organizations since they can 
affect the balance between the two elites. 
The outcome of the vying fo r the support of the general public by the 
two elites depends on which contextual variables influence their scope of 
activity and how they react to these variables. Which variables are we 
talking about? In order to answer that question let me use several recent 
analyses by Clans Offe. Namely, he claims that the singularity of the 
transformational process in Eastern Europe lies in the fact that it has to 
make several decisive development steps at the same tim e, while Western 
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Europe had St;Vt:ntl centuries for the same process.2 Tbe.se are: the esLuh-
lishmenl of freedoms and righls and the market economy based on 
them. the realization or democratic participation and ensuring social rights 
within the <;l<tte welfare system (in snme cases we should add the fourth 
<;Lcp. which usually precede..' all these processes - the creation of the 
national state). Partic:ulnrly burdensome in this 'imultaneity of transforma-
tions is that they are taking place after democratic participation rights 
have been implemenlctl, which means that they have ro get democratic 
legitimation. If, then , the transition to market economy fails to fulfi11 the 
expectations of the masses reg;mling economic security and social justice. 
that process can be o.;topped or even reversed. ln other words, lite tran ·i-
tion 10\\.--drdo; libe ral institution in E.Jo,tem Europe must Ot.'CUT in the con-
ditions of greater economic security and social jw;tice than was the ca.<;e 
in the history of Western Europe. Bc:.iucs, because of democratic mecha-
nisml>, I his process is reversible HI any moment. Similar consequences are 
implied by another Offe's assertion, according to which the East Europelln 
transformations are marked by a Jnuhle framework of n.:ference: towards 
" the West" and towards their own "history" (or it · ideological image).3 
The pressure coming from tbtlt double cnmparison implies relatively high 
criteria uf expectations regart.ling economic security and social justice. 
These expectations are included in the political process and must be taken 
into consident linn by the political pmlagonists if they want to ensure 
democratic legitimation. 
Which contextual vt~riab les and the ensuing problems may be drawn 
from Offe's ant~lyses? 
The first is economic and social security, i.e. which costs of the transt-
tion towards market economy are deemed acceptable. Titc acceptability of 
the cost ucpends on several factors: 00 the government's ability to t:nsnre 
for <til citizens the suhl>istence minimum; on the time horizon relevant for 
the individual e.stim<~te of the cosu;4; <~nd finally, it also depends on the 
re lativt: estimate of individually acceptable costs of the transition - in 
rclaliun to other mcmhcrs of tbe society a well as to the criteria inl-
ported from mher countries which are regarded relevant 
2 Compare Claus Offe, •·nus Dilemma der Glcich7eitigkeiL Demokrntisierung 
und Marl..'twi.rtschufl rn 0 !europa .. , Mcrlmr, XLV, 4, 1991, pp. 279-292: also the 
longer English version: "Capilah~m by Deruot:ratic Design? Dcrnoc..Tatic Theory 
Facing lhe Triplt; TransHion in Eust Central Europe•·, Sucial Ue.~earch, LVID, 4, 
1991, pp. Rf>S-892. 
3 Offe, Clau , 'The Politi~ of Social Policy in East European Transitions: 
Antecedents. Agents, ami Agenda of Reform~. Social R eseuc:b, LX, 4, 1993, pp. 
649-684. 
4 For example, a drop in tht: standard of Living i more or less acceptable 
within n four~ycar electoral cycle, but becomes iuculcuJable if it exceeds this 
period. 
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The second variable refers to social juslicc. The differences in the 
standard of Jiving and the uneven distribution of the costs of the tran i-
tion c:m he accepted as temporarily necessa1-y only if they c:m he plausi-
bly interpreted as the pt ice of genera I prospe rity which is to be achieved 
in due Lime. 
Let me infer the third variable from Offt:'s diH&'TH1sis of "the West" as 
a relevant referential ntndd for F..m,t European societies. The West is not 
only a mmlcl for comparison but tbe objective as well. So the third vari-
able is the plausibility of those political pmgrnmmaric objectives that strive 
towards the inlc!,rr.ttiun of the ir societies witlh the West (for example, in 
the form of the membership in the European Uninn). 
My opinion is that the three already mentioned social and econom1c 
variables should be joined by two more which arc conditioned either by 
the belated completion o f natiomtl und state integration or by the exis-
tence of ctlmic minorities (or by both these factors) and may be very 
important in giving legitimncy to political e lites in Eastern Europe. 
So, the fourth variuhlc would he the articu lation of national identity in 
a national -;tate. 
And fmally, the fifth variable include-; the attitude towards ethnic mi-
norities and potential ur actual ethnic conflicts. 
Let us investigate whether the sugge<,Lcd C<Jtegorie-s of political pro-
tagonists and constellati(HJ\ of political problems are applicahle In the past 
experience' nf transition in Eastern Europe. 
3. 
Firs t of all, 1 tbink it can bt: prnveci that a dichotomous pola rity of 
liberal and national-populi'>! e lites exists in most East Eumpcan countries 
(the stalt:!> nf former Soviet Union have been lcf1 out since 1 am not 
particularly familiar w1th the situaLiun there). Ln other words, LhL mean-; 
that Lbe central political friction in rhose countries is the nne among par-
ties or party hlocs and coalitions who e leadl!rs might be aligned with one 
of these poles (the pola rization of the e lites may occur within parties as 
well) . Let u~ !-cc what the situation looks Jjke when it comes to individual 
coun tries.' 
s My analysis is ba:~cc.J on a series of available t:ompurative or monographic 
studies that analpe one or more Eru.t European counrries: .Bergluud, Stcn. Del· 
lenbraot, Jan Ake (et.l.), The: New /Jemocrocies in Eustc:ro Europe: f':my systelllS 
and Pohi.ical rfe.;wages, Edw:trd Elgar, Aldcrshot, IWJ ; Volten, Peter M.E (ed.) 
/Jound to Change: Con~uhdaung JJ~mocrocy in &51 Cc:ntral £uro~ Institute for 
East West Studies, ~ew YoTk and Prague, 199~ Szobo!.lai. Gyorgy (ed), Hying 
Blind: i:;mergmg Democracies in Ea!.t-Cc:otral Europe. llungarian Potiti~-ul S~"icncc 
Association. Budapest, 1992: l'ismeanu. Vladimir. Tudoran, Dorin, .. 1be Bucarest 
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T ht:re are two types of Jjberal politica l elites: radical libe rals (not nu -
merous) and liberal socia l democrats. The examples of the first type are 
the Civil D i!mocratk Party of Vaclav Klau in the Czech Republic as well 
as the entire government coalilion this party leads (the coalition has. with 
cenain change!., heen in power for four yean.) ;~nd the Democra tic Union 
in Pnhmd whjcb, between 1990 and 1993, formed three government~ under 
Mazowiecld, Balcerowicz and Suchocka. The other type of liberals is more 
often fount.!. Ttl' r epresentntives are Slovenian Liberal-democratic Party of 
Janez Drnovsek, as well as Lite government coalitio ns il formed after 
1992, then tht: reformed Po lish communists in the Democratic Left. 
Alliance whu. together with the Peasants' Pany, formed the gove rnment in 
1993 wruch is still in ptlWCI , and the latest Hungarian government 
coalition of rcfurmed socialists and Frc:c democrats. which \l.-as fnrmed in 
1 99~. 
NntionaJ-populil' t e lites in bastern Europe fa ll imo two categoric.: that 
of conservative national-populists with a strong Catholic trait and th at of 
the alliances o f populil->L le ftist parties (which o fLcn comprise much of tl11:: 
ancien reg~im:) with extremist national i:o.t!.. The examples for the first type 
are the.: ruling Croatian party, the Croauan Democratic Union. the H un-
garian govemm~nt coalition 1990-1994 led by the Hung;trian Democratic 
Porum, or the Polish Catho lic bloc made up of the panie.., \\ith least 
popular .,,,pport. The examplc!. fur the second ca tegory a re political conli-
tions such as MiloseviC!i socialists and variou!\ radical nationalist i111 Ser-
bia, the a lliance of Iliescu's Democrath: Nationa l Salvation Front and the 
Party of R om anian National Unity of Ubeorghc Funar which has been 
ruling in Romania "ince 1992. and the cooperation between MeCiar's 
MO\•e mcnt for Democratic SJO\ :ikia and the Slovakian ational Party. Thi!-
classification does nol imply that the re pectivi! national constellatiuns can 
be equated, but it does imply that the fundamentaJ politicnl conflict in all 
tho!.~.: commies may be reduccn to the polari£ation of liberal and rw-
tinmll-populist e li tes. 
SJndromc", Journal of' Democw(.'), vol. 4, I, 1993, 41-52: von Deyme, Klau:.. 
Systemw.x-hse/ in O~tc:uropa. Suhrkrunp, Frunkfnrt am Main, 199-l: Agh. Atilla 
(ed.), The Emergence t>f &I Ccncra/ European Pnrliamenr<>: The First Steps, 
l lungnrian CenlJc of Democracy Stui.Jics, Hudapest, 1994: Smolnar, AJex:ande1 , 
"The DissoluJion of SoliiJwity", .Journal of Dt·mo,TaC)~ vol. 5. I. 1994; Wessels, 
13e rnhard, Klingcmann, I Lnos-DieteJ , Dcmncrnric Traosformttlion tlnd the Prerequi-
iiilcs of Democrtllic Opposition m Enst ond Ccntra/ f:'urope, WisscnschafL<~?.enlmm 
13erlin fur So:.~:iulforschung, Berlill, 1994: l t:uschikjan, MugardiL'lch, WeilcmanJLJ. Pe-
ter R. ( l lrsg.), ParteJJlllltlscbaften in Osteuropa. rerclinand Scboningh. P:~derboro 
etc., 199-t lt ~hould he pointed out LhaL lhe majority of tbe literarure IJcab wilh 
Ccnlral european countric . .-s, Le_ Poland, Lhc Czech Republic, Slovalaa :10d Hun-
gary, somcwbat le<t with Romauill, Bulgaria and the new Bnhk states, while tbe 
terrilOI')' of former Yugoslavia bns been completely left ouL 
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As I have already mentioned, in some East European countries there 
are other major politicaJ protagoni! ~ - clhnic minuritit!S' pllrties - and 
they om irrnuence the power balance among tbe antagonistic dominant 
elites. Such politically significant minority parties arc, fur cx<~mple, Hungar-
ian partie~ in Romania :md Slovakia, Turkish party in Oulgaria and both 
Albanian panies in Macedonia. 
l would like to show that the ~ucccs., or failure of liberal elites in 
Eao,tcm F.urnpe and consequently the overaJJ success of liberal reforms has 
mostly depende-d on how those elites reacted to the mentinn~,;t.l pmhlems. 
t\ successful solution to thni>c problems hlls secured political advantage for 
liheral elites and ensured for them the necessary majority. However, if 
liberal e lites have been incapable to offer answers tn tltn::.c pmhlems or if 
they have simply ignoretl them, liberal reforms have been blocked and 
nill'iont~ l-populist elites gained the upper hand. 
I) Regarding tbe first i:-.suc, that of eronornic and social security, the 
Czech Repnblic and Slovakia are good examples of successful liheral 
strategies. l n the Czech Republic, Klaus's government has complemented a 
successJul antiinnational polic:y with socially prudent structural policies and 
corportltivist strategies of social accord: unemployment has heen kept at 
bay, even at the cost of slowing duwn stmctural reforms, while the policy 
of low salaries has been negotiated and agreed upon with trade unions. 
Tn Sloveni:l, Dmovsek's government has managed to avoid deep recession 
and a high rate of unemployment t.IC!·pite low inflation and relatively high 
nlnrie~. rn huth countries these successes have been rcwanJcd at tbe 
polls. 
In PolauU, huwe"-er, radical liberal parties have been only partly suc-
ce. ful. Their antiinflational policies anti the polic:y of economic revival 
have bad some success, but 'ucial co~t" in the form of unemployment and 
lowcn!l.l income ht~ve been rather high. That is wh) at the September 
e lections of 1993 people voted for ocial-t.lcmocratic, toned-down continua-
tion of liberalization. 
The examples nf the failure of liberal parties to muhilii'c the expecta-
tions of ecurity among the population ami, con'\equently, the rise of na-
tional populists, are Romania und Serbia: the re, the status quo clile.'\, 
relying 011 the successfu l na tionnlist mobilization of social fears, have all 
but foiled liberal economic refum1s. 
2) The prnhlem of social justice has also been lH.:st s(J!ved by the lib-
e ra l ~lites in the Czech Republic a11tl S lovenia . In both states relatively 
democratic strategies of privati7.<tl ion have been impJementctl and the vot-
e rs found these strategies socially fair. J\lso, tlte distrihution of the costs 
of the lnmsformation has mo tly been considered evenhanded, thanks to 
the income and employment policies in the Czech R epublic ami the in-
come pohcy in Slovenia. 
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In Po land, on the contrary, the relaLivdy successful liberal economic 
policy hil the skids because of in~u fficien t observance o f sociu l justice: this 
ha." provoked a stt ong r~-.cntment agajn t tho. ~ who have profited from 
the m msitional process., although at tltc !.<tme ume the circum. Lances have 
improver! on the whole. 
The negative example is the situation in Croatia: here the ruling na-
tioual-populist elite has managed to supplant the issues of social justice 
with rallying national M~lid<~rity against the o ut!\itle enemy. The liberal op-
position bas failed to cac;h in on some nugrant examples of ocial injustice 
in the cxmrse of the transitional process. 
3) The issue o f accommodation and (perhaps) future integra tion with 
Weste rn Ruwpe has been politiet.dly plausibly thematized only in the coun-
tries of the so called "Vi~egrad brroup" (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Hu ngary) and in Sloverua. ln thcs~ countries the genera l public has 
accepted the perspective of Lhc membership in Lh.e European Union as 
sufficiently probable ami desirable. Such a con tellation mo tly benefited 
the libe.ral elites and weakened Lhe national populisu . (Partly responsible 
for this were also the intl!mal rifts, like tho. c that occurred in M~ciar's 
Movement for D~;;mocratic Slovakia anJ in Antnll's Hungarian Democratic 
F'o rurn.) 
ln other East European countries with dominant national-pupulist e lites., 
however, isolationist pohcies toward!\ the West have pr~vailed . J'he opposi-
tional lih<!r<tl elites have not m:tnaged to comc up with a convincing al-
tcrn<~tive to the integr ation of their countries with the West. 
4) The proposa ls how to solve the problems o f national identity ami 
the constitution of a national sta te have varied from one liberal e lite to 
another. lt can he said tha t in four countries (Poland, I Iungary. the 
Czech Republic and SIO\enia) the hberal elite~ hnve successfully prevented 
political instrumeotalization of na tional itlcntity by national populists. It 
seems that in Poland and Hungary these issues have lost the ir political 
edgt:: the mttional-populist elites with the pro!,rrammes cente red a round 
national identity were sou ndly defeated in the last elections. In Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic. the I.Jl1t:ral e lites have put to a good use na-
tional legitimation m the d rcumstance of Lhc creauon of n~;;w national 
~tal es. 
ln the countries like Slovakia, Serbia, Romania and Croatia, uational-
populist elites still have a monopoly on national identity wbich has up to 
now been an insurmountable ob)\tacle for liberal nppo ition . Serbia is a 
special e<t"e sinc-e the prt punderance of the i ·ue of national identity has 
lcd to lhe disappearanCe! of genuine hbc n1l opposition. 
5) The pmh lem o f e thnic minorities can be found in a politie<~ Uy rele-
vant form only in . ome East European countries. Unfonu nate ly, and a~ a 
rule, its existence has been misused by na tional-populist e lites even in the 
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countries where, like in Slovakia and Romania, the ethnic minorities' par-
ties follow extremely moderate and cooperative policies. 
The sole examples where liberal forces have benefited from coopera-
tive ethnic minorities are Bulgaria and Macedonia. In Bulgaria, the Turk-
ish minority has supported the ljberal Bulgarian opposition whiJe in Mace-
donia the moderalt: soci<Ll-libt:ral govt:rnmcnt managctl lo prolong its man-
date (even after the internal rifts) thanks to the support of the Albanian 
ethruc party. 
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Let me sum up. I hope that the provided material about the course 
of liberal reforms in Eastern Europe wiU suffice to make my starting hy-
pothesis plausible: the !-mccess of the liberalization of East European so-
cieties to a large extent depends on the quality of libecal political elites 
and their ability to solve the pmblems of ecouomic and social sccuriLy, 
social justice, their countries' integration with the West, the preservation 
of national identity and overcoming ethnic conflicts, and in this way to 
secure democratic legitimation. 
The successes of the Czech Republic and Slovenia cannot be explained 
solely by favourable historical circumstances: after all, both countries hat! 
to solve some difficult problems while establishing their national states, the 
problems which did not exist in .Poland, Hungary or Romania. On the 
contrary, 1 think that competent hberal politicians and their political pro-
grammes secu red Ll1e success of liberal reforms in these countries. 
Poland and Hungary are partly successful examples of liht:raliz,ation. In 
Poland the policy of radie<1l economic liberalization was replaced with the 
policy of slower and moderate liberalization tempered by socie:tl-tlemocratic 
correctives. It is impottant, however, that national populists could not 
profit from the electoral defeat of radical liberals. ln Hungary, the na-
tiona l-populist government coalition, which il1 the last four years slowed 
down liberal refonns, was ousted at the elections and replaced by a lib-
eral coalition that \vill pmbahly speed up the Jjberalization. 
Truly problematic, however, are those countries in which, due to vari-
ous reasons, the national-populist elites have gained so much ground that 
liberal reforms h;we scant chances: in Croatia tllis dominance was caused 
by the aggression and the prolongation of the wt~r, in Serbia by the abso-
lute priority of intperialist nationalist politics, in Romania by a coincidence 
of nationalism and status quo interests. Without chanbring the contextual 
circumstances in those countries, liberal elites will have little chances of 
success in the future. 
Translated by 
BoZica .fakov!ev 
